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HOUSEHOLD VERSUS INDIVIDUAL VALUATION: WHAT’S THE 
DIFFERENCE? 
 
Abstract. 
Standard practice in stated preference typically blurs the distinction between 
household and individual responses, but without a clear theoretical or empirical 
justification for this approach. To date there have been no empirical tests of 
whether values for say a two adult household elicited by interviewing one randomly 
selected adult are the same as the values generated by interviewing both adults 
simultaneously. Using cohabiting couples, we conduct a choice experiment field 
study valuing reductions in dietary health risks. In one treatment a random 
individual is chosen from the couple and interviewed alone; in the other treatment, 
both partners are questioned jointly. We find significant differences in household 
values calculated from joint as opposed to individual responses, with further 
variation between the values elicited from men and women. Our results question 
the assumption, implicit in common practice, that differences between individually 
and jointly elicited estimates of household values can effectively be ignored.  
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This paper reports on research designed to examine the relationship between individual and 
household measures of valuation in a stated preference setting. We test particular theories 
about individual and household willingness to pay and, specifically, we test whether it 
matters that stated preference exercises are almost universally conducted with individuals 
rather than with all the adult decision-makers in a household. Our starting point is the 
observation that, as typically conducted, the practice of stated preference blurs the 
distinction between the individual and the household. Normally, in face-to-face exercises, 
an adult is picked at random from the household and asked to provide information on the 
valuation of a change in a public or private good. In some methods (e.g. mail-based 
surveys), no control is placed over who answers the valuation questions. In both types of 
case, data on household composition and size may be obtained and used in modeling 
willingness to pay (WTP) or willingness to accept (WTA), but no formal distinction is 
made between individual and household valuation.1 
Not distinguishing between answers given by the individual and the household may 
be justifiable on two grounds. First, in some economic theories the choices made by the 
household as a whole and those made by individuals within the household are identical. 
For instance in the unitary model of the household (e.g. Becker (1974)), incentives are 
aligned in such a way that individuals act as if they are maximizing a household utility 
function. The unitary model exhibits the more general property of income pooling, 
meaning that choices made by the household are independent of the source of income. If 
income pooling is satisfied then individual and household expressions of value coincide 
and the identity of the unit or sub-unit of the household which provides stated preference 
information is immaterial (Munro, 2005). The alternative justification for ignoring the 
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distinction between individual and household is empirical: the difference between 
measures of value elicited from individuals and the household may be so small as to justify 
the existing standard practice. As an example, household willingness to pay might be a 
simple average of the individual willingness to pay figures for the adults within the 
household, in which case a random selection of subject would provide a consistent estimate 
of household WTP. Alternatively, the balance of power within households may not be 
sensitive to small changes in the source of income, in which case for small consumption, 
the household may exhibit behaviour which is largely indistinguishable from that predicted 
by income pooling. 
The evidence to date is mixed on the most appropriate model of the household, but 
it is largely against the unitary model of the household and income pooling (Alderman et al, 
1995).  Using the natural experiment provided by a reform of the UK tax and benefit 
system, Lundberg et al. (1997) reject income pooling, showing instead that expenditure on 
goods such as men’s and women’s clothing are sensitive to the source of household income. 
Their results are supported by Browning and Chiappori (1998) and Phipps and Burton 
(1998) where non-experimental family expenditure data is used to show the influence of 
the source of income on expenditure shares for consumer goods. Meanwhile, Bateman and 
Munro, (2003), pioneer experimental tests of household decision-making, using choices in 
which the identity of the income recipient is manipulated. They too find against income 
pooling. So, on the face of it, equivalence between household and individual valuation 
looks unlikely. To date though there have been no stated preference field survey 
specifically designed to see if there is a significant difference between values elicited from 
component parts of a household.2 
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This article reports on an exercise designed to provide such a test. We conduct a 
choice experiment to value changes in food risks using a sample of cohabiting couples, 
both married and unmarried. In one treatment a randomly selected individual is chosen 
from the couple and takes part in a face-to-face interview, providing responses on behalf of 
the household. In the other treatment, both partners are asked household choice questions 
jointly, again in a face-to-face interview. We find significant differences in the values 
elicited from the two treatments. Moreover, the values elicited from couples are not a 
simple average of those elicited from men and women.3 Our paper therefore suggests that 
at least from some goods, there can be significant differences in the values elicited from the 
household as a whole and from its various components. 
 
Theory. 
In this section we outline the theory that frames the exercise. A fuller version can be 
found in Munro (2005). Consider a two-adult household where for each individual i = 1,2, 
preferences are defined over a vector of privately consumed goods, a vector of household 
goods (i.e. public goods local to the household) and a public good. Indirect utility, Vi = 
Vi(z,m1,m2), i = 1,2, depends ultimately on a person’s own income, their partner’s income 
(m1 and m2) and the level of a public good, z. Vi is therefore a reduced form, in the sense 
that it shows the relationship between utility, z and household incomes, given the 
unmodeled resource allocation game that is played out within the household.  It also 
embodies the assumption that, in making choices, individuals anticipate any readjustment 
of the intra-household allocation that results. For simplicity in this formulation, all other 
arguments which would typically enter the indirect utility function (e.g. prices) are 
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suppressed. The theory is perfectly compatible with altruism. For instance we could write 
utility Vi = Vi(v1(z,m1,m2), v2(z,m1,m2)), where the lower case vis were the private utilities 
of the partners, but this could still ultimately be written as Vi = Vi(z,m1,m2). 
Assume that indirect utility has the following properties: 
i. all arguments are essential. e.g. Vi(0,m1,m2) < Vi(z,m1’,m2’) all, z, m1, m2, m1’, m2’. 
ii. Vi is strictly increasing in all arguments when all arguments are strictly positive.  
iii. Vi is continuous in all arguments. 
Income Pooling (IP): for all i, mi, z, say that the household income pools for ∆m 
when Vi(z,m1-∆m, m2+∆m) = Vi(z,m1,m2)  i=1,2. 
For z’  > z > 0 we define individual willingness to pay (iWTPi) as follows:  
iWTP1 : V1(z’,m1-iWTP1, m2) = V1(z,m1,m2),  
iWTP2: V2(z’,m1, m2-iWTP2) = V2(z,m1,m2). 
Individual WTP is therefore the maximum amount that the household member is 
willing to pay to receive the increase in the value of the public good. This definition 
corresponds to the typical format of standard stated preference exercises. 
Household WTP (hWTP) is then defined as the maximum payment that the 
household jointly and collectively is willing to pay. Whereas the theory of individual 
valuation is extensive and largely settled, there is no coherent body of valuation theory for 
the multi-agent household, principally because for some models of allocation, household 
indifference curves may not exist (Samuelson (1956))). As such, to write down an indirect 
utility function for the household and to define hWTP formal in a manner analogous to the 
definition for iWTP is to assume already some properties of intra-household allocation that 
may not be true. 
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Munro (2005) uses the following possible formal definition of hWTP, which we 
label as hWTPa in order to make clear its specific nature. 
hWTPa = max WTP1+WTP2 s.t. Vi(z’,m1-WTP1, m2-WTP2) = Vi(z,m1,m2)  i=1,2.  
In other words, hWTPa is the largest amount of money which can be extracted from 
a household for an increase in the public good, subject to the constraint that each individual 
is no worse off than in the situation without the change. From this Munro (2005) proves:  
Proposition 1. For z’, mi > 0, IP   iWTP1 = iWTP2 = hWTPa 
Proposition 2. iWTP1 = iWTP2 = hWTPa   IP  
The intuition behind these propositions is straightforward. When a household pools 
all income, the identity of the person who pays for goods does not matter. So the effect on 
individual utility of paying say, £10 for an environmental improvement, is the same on all 
members of the household whether it is person 1 who pays, person 2 or the household 
collectively. Conversely if preferences between different combinations of the good z and 
payments never depend on the identity of the payee and the interviewee then this amounts 
to a definition of income pooling. 
The propositions provide a benchmark model. One implication of them is that with 
a sample of couples we can test for income pooling using either the difference between the 
iWTP of the partners or by using the difference between the iWTP of one partner and that 
of the household.4 However, our central concern here is in the relationship between iWTP 
and hWTP and for this crucial relationship, the propositions provide explicit guidance.  
Let us relabel our sample members by f (=female) or m (=male), then our starting 
hypotheses are as follows: 5 
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H1A iWTPi = hWTP i=m,f 
H1B iWTPm = iWTPf  
Outside of income pooling and with other definitions of hWTP there are a few 
results available, for specific models of household decision-making. In Bergstrom, (2003), 
for instance partners have a veto on decisions, making household WTP the minimum of 
individual WTP. We take this as our second hypothesis: 
H2:  hWTP=min(iWTPm , iWTPf) 
Quiggin, (1998) and Strand, (2007) analyze WTP in the context of the Pareto-
efficient household and find that in general hWTP equals the sum of individual WTP 
except where altruism between partners is confined to consumption of private goods, in 
which case hWTP is less than the sum of iWTP. We take their general case as the basis of 
our third hypothesis: 
H3: hWTP = iWTPm + iWTPf 
We noted above that using iWTP might be an acceptable proxy for hWTP if, on 
average iWTP is approximately equal to hWTP. We use this suggestion for our fourth 
hypothesis: 
H4: hWTP = 0.5(iWTPm + iWTPf) 
An alternative to the random selection of interviewee is a method in which the 
researcher first identifies the relevant decision-maker in the household and interviews them. 
This method is often implicit in, for example, surveys where anglers are asked about their 
valuation of lakes and fish-stocks. An explicit example is Hensher et al, (2004), where the 
household was first asked about decision-making responsibilities with regard to utility 
payments in order to target the questionnaire. One way to make sense of this approach is to 
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see it as a means of eliciting hWTP without interviewing all householders collectively. Let 
iWTPT be the WTP figure elicited from the target. If the targeting process is accurate and 
reliable, then iWTPT=hWTP. We take this as our final hypothesis, to be tested using 
information from questions asked about responsibility for food purchase choices. 
H5: hWTP = iWTPT . 
 
Design. 
In the light of the above theory we design an experiment to test our hypotheses 
using a dual treatment design applied to a sample of established couples. In one treatment 
both partners are interviewed together, providing joint estimates of household WTP; in the 
other treatment one partner is chosen at random and interviewed separately.  
Given the stated preference nature of our study the obvious methodological choice 
was between the contingent valuation (CV) and choice experiment (CE) approaches. 
Although our design and consequent results should be applicable to both formats, recent 
interest in the CE approach (Adamowicz et al., (1999); Louviere et al., (2000); Bennett and 
Blamey, (2001)), combined with its high statistical efficiency and a growing bank of policy 
applications, made this the preferred methodological basis for our study.  
In order to enhance the credibility and robustness of the valuation scenario, the 
experiment focused upon a highly familiar private good; the household weekly food 
shopping purchases. Specifically subjects were asked valuation questions trading increases 
in the weekly household shopping bill in return for improvements in two health-related 
attributes of food. After facing background questions on food shopping and attitudes to 
healthy eating, the subjects were introduced to the following food-attributes: 
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1. the percentage of instances in which UK government samples of 
supermarket food tested positive for pesticide residues; 
2. the percentage of energy obtained from fat for an average UK diet. 
The subjects were given information about the health risks of fat content and 
pesticide residues as well as basic information about current UK average levels for the two 
attributes. They were told that changes in food production methods could alter the values of 
these two attributes. These changes were potentially costly, but they would require no 
change to food shopping habits on the part of consumers. So, subjects were asked to 
imagine no change to their shopping habits, but to consider reductions in fat content and 
the level of positive tests for pesticide residues6.  
Given our focus upon the difference between individual and household WTP, we 
wished to avoid other sources of choice complexity and therefore adopted arguably the 
simplest format of CE task, that being a choice between a constant ‘status quo’ (SQ) and a 
varied ‘alternative’ state. Figure 1 shows a typical choice faced by a subject. The shaded 
area in the apples showed the percentage of instances in which positive residues for 
pesticides would be found in government tests. Each of the chocolate bars represents 
approximately the reduction from a 5% drop in the average energy intake from fat. 
Figure 1 here. 
The design and wording of these choices was identical across treatments – both 
groups of respondents were asked “which would you choose?” out of the two options 
available in each choice. The only difference in scripts was that, when couples were 
interviewed together they were told that they had to make an agreed choice. Prior to the 
choice questions, all respondents were reminded that, 
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“When you are considering these questions do think carefully about whether your 
household really would prefer to pay for the alternative, or would prefer to continue 
purchasing other things that are important to you. Remember that the cost of the 
alternatives schemes is money which would be coming out your pocket and that 
would mean there would be less money for you to spend on other purchases that 
you might like to make.” 
Attribute levels for the percentage energy intake from fat varied from 40% (the 
current figure) to 35, 30 and 25%. 7  Meanwhile, attribute levels for positive tests for 
pesticides varied from 30% (the current figure) to 25, 20 and 15%. Subjects were informed 
about all the possible attribute levels prior to facing the choice questions. Cost levels were 
£1, £2, £3.5 and £5 per capita8 increases in weekly food shopping bills, giving 64 possible 
alternative consumption bundles. Four of these bundles are clearly dominated by the status-
quo (i.e. cost increases for no changes in consumption). Because we wished to control for 
all possible interactive effects a full factorial design was used, with the dominated bundles 
excluded. Four variants of the questionnaire were therefore used, with each subject facing 
16 questions and with four questions repeated across more than one sub-sample in order to 
test for order effects in the data. 
The utility model. 
Since the status-quo and alternatives differ only in the values of the three attributes, 
we concentrate on utility equations of the basic form: 
  jjjjj FATPESTPRICEU 321  
where Uj is the utility of the jth participant, PRICE, PEST and FAT are the values 
for the price, pesticide residue and fat content attributes respectively and the random 
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element υ follows an extreme value distribution. The coefficients βij have the functional 
form, 
  ijkjikiFiMiij xFEMALEMALE  0  
where MALE  is a dummy for the  interviewed, FEMALE is a dummy for the case where 
the woman is interviewed alone, kjx  are the values of the other k
th characteristic for the 
subject j and ηij is the random term. In general we do not have a clear prior for the 
coefficients on the characteristics. For instance, compared to other consumers, regular 
purchasers of organic foods might place a higher weight on the opportunity to obtain a 
lower level of tested residues in the typical food basket. Alternatively, as buyers of 
foodstuffs which are certified free of non-organic pesticides, they may place a lower value 
on pesticide reduction because they are not buying the ‘typical’ basket anyway. 
The elements εj, and ηij allow the parameters to be potentially random. We take a 
normal distribution for εj, but choosing a functional form for the ηij is more problematic 
since we have strong priors that βij are non-positive for PRICE, FAT and PEST. For these 
variables, if ηij is assumed normally distributed then we face the possibility that for some 
respondents, βij has the wrong sign. There are two approaches we can take: since the prime 
task of the research is to compare treatments, we could ignore the sign issue and choose a 
general form even if it produces a large numbers of wrongly-signed coefficients. 
Alternatively following the advice of Hensher and Greene, (2003), we could impose 
restrictions on the distributional forms for ηij that ensure that no individual has an 
intuitively perverse response to changes in the PRICE, FAT and PEST attributes. In 
practice we plot a course somewhere between these extremes by selecting a triangular 
specification for ηij for the FAT, PEST and PRICE variables and imposing the restriction 
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that the triangular distribution is bounded by zero.  The restrictions constrain the sign of the 
coefficient on PRICE, FAT and PEST, though they still allow for perverse effects overall 
through interaction terms between the attributes and the x variables. 
In our questionnaire we have three questions about control of shopping and cooking 
in the household, which ask respondents to identify the pattern of responsibility for food 
choices, for payment for the shopping and for cooking. We use this information to test 
hypothesis H5. If targeting on the basis of answers to the three questions is successful then 
including variables based on these  questions to the estimated model should eliminate the 
apparent explanatory power of knowing whether the respondent was male, female or a 
couple. Not surprisingly, the answers to these questions are highly correlated - in the main 
the person responsible for shopping, also tends to pay for it and does the cooking, so we 
use only the question about the identity of the main food shopper. For the purposes of 
estimation this is coded as 1 if the couple were interviewed jointly or if the individual 
interviewed answered that they bore responsibility for food purchase decisions. Otherwise 
the variable was coded as zero. The dummy was then interacted with all three attributes. 9 
 
Results. 
The sample was constructed from a population of households who had previously 
agreed to be put on a database of potential subjects for experiments and surveys executed 
by the University of East Anglia. All couples on the database were contacted by phone and 
all subjects were interviewed at home. Prior to the interview respondents were randomly 
allocated to one of the two treatments: individual or couple interview. When a household 
was selected for the individual treatment, the conventional survey approach was followed 
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in which a prior rule for choosing one person at random for the interview was used. In the 
couples treatment both partners were interviewed together and asked to make choices 
jointly.10 
The sample is 142 couples, 70 of whom were interviewed jointly. The average age 
of interviewees was 41.5 with a range from 18 to 75. Mean household income was £28,500 
(at the time of the survey £1 ≈US$1.76 ≈ €1.46) and mean weekly expenditure on food was 
£77 – with a minimum of £20 and a maximum of £200. The distribution of household size 
shows a typical preponderance of 2 person households (50% of the sample) with most 
remaining households having 3 (20%) or 4 (23%) members. No households had more than 
6 members. 
Table 1 summarizes some of the household characteristics variables. In this table, 
Healthy and Fat intake are derived variables. In the case of Healthy: for each of six 
common foods (e.g. milk), subjects were asked if they were regular purchasers, infrequent 
purchasers or never purchased low fat varieties (e.g. skimmed or semi-skimmed milk). 
Subjects received a score of 2 for each good they purchased regularly and 1 for each 
foodstuff bought infrequently and the values summed over all six goods. The average score 
was 5.74 per household, indicating that most subjects were purchasers of at least some of 
the goods. For Fat intake we coded each individual as 1-5 (where 1 = significantly below 
average fat intake and 5 = significantly above average intake) and added the score for the 
two partners. 11 Around 41% of subjects stated that they were regular purchasers of organic 
foods. Those who did not purchase regularly most commonly stated they saw no clear 
benefits from organic foods. Those who did purchase most commonly stated that it tasted 
better and it was better for the environment. 
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 [Table 1 about here.] 
As a preliminary, we examine the internal consistency of the stated choices for men, 
women and couples.  Our specific check is a comparison of all pairs of questions where a) 
the alternative bundle X in one question strictly dominates the alternative bundle Y in the 
second question and b) Y is chosen in the second question. By transitivity, X should then 
be chosen in the first question. We find consistency rates of 95.2% for women, 95.8% for 
men and 93.5% for couples. All of these rates suggest a good level of understanding 
amongst our participants and none of them differ from each other at 1% significance levels. 
Figure 2 summarizes the responsiveness of subjects to the three dimensions of the 
choice problem. The values depicted are an unweighted average over all the values of the 
other two attributes. This explains the slight upward kink in the diagram for pesticides 
which like the other two, is otherwise downward sloping. 
We tested for order effects and found no evidence of them and so we pool the data 
from the four variants. In the regressions, all of which are estimated using 200 Halton 
draws for the simulation (Train, 1999), we experimented with a number of specifications, 
including non-linear interactions between the attributes (which turn out to be insignificant) 
and random parameters for the interactions between treatment and attributes (which were 
also not significant). In the main, socio-economic variables such as age tend to be highly 
insignificant, but in many variants of the model interactive effects between Healthy on the 
one hand and the attributes for fat content and pesticide residues on the other hand can be 
significant. For simplicity and to focus on the main purpose of the paper, the selected 
results in Table 2 concentrate on three representative equations. 12  We discuss the 
sensitivity of our main results to specification at the end of this section. 
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Table 2 here. 
The third of the equations (labeled ‘Target’) is the focus of our results and their 
interpretation. It includes the interaction terms between whether the respondent was a 
decision-maker (DM) and the three attributes. The other two equations are for comparison. 
In the model the attribute variables, pesticide residues, fat content and price, have negative 
signs and they are highly significant (i.e. at or below the 1% level). The hypothesis that the 
parameters are not random is also rejected at the 1% level for each of the random 
parameters individually. To evaluate whether the equation accords with our priors about 
the impact of price, pesticide risk and fat content, we employ the methods of Train, 1999, 
using the respondent choice data to estimate conditional estimates of the marginal impact 
of changes in price, fat content and pesticide risk for each subject. Overall none of the 
respondents have an estimated response to the Price attribute that is perverse. Four subjects 
have the unanticipated sign for fat attribute and 13 show a non-negative response to the 
pesticide attribute in the estimates (the figures are similar for the other equations in Table 
2).  
We now turn to the impact of the treatments. Out of the parameters for the 
individual treatment, two are significant. A likelihood ratio test rejects the null that 
collectively the  variables add no explanatory power to the model (p =0.015). Holding 
everything else constant, being interviewed individually raises sensitivity to price and fat 
content, but reduces sensitivity to pesticide residues (compared to being interviewed as a 
couple).  Note though that the net effect of a rise in price or fat content is still a reduction 
in the probability of accepting the alternative at the mean of the attribute parameter. The fat 
and price parameters for the female treatment are positive and significant at the 1% level or 
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lower. So, compared to the men, women are less sensitive to changes in the fat and 
pesticide attributes. Collectively the female terms are significant at the 1% level. 
One DM coefficient is significant (pesticide risk), while a likelihood ratio test of the 
joint hypothesis that all parameter values are equal to zero gives a p-value of 0.13, 
suggesting that their joint explanatory power is limited. Comparing the first and third 
equations to understand the impact of adding the DM variables we can see that the main 
effect is to reduce the significance of the individual and female variables, but as we have 
seen, not to the extent of eliminating the explanatory power of the treatment effects in the 
Target equation. 
It is theoretically possible that differences between treatments are purely due to 
differences in the scale variable (Swait and Louviere, (1993)). Direct observation of the 
variance terms is not possible, so we consider this hypothesis by indirect means, using the 
Swait-Louviere test. In all cases the restriction that the parameter vectors (excluding 
constant) for treatments are equal after optimal scaling is rejected at the 1% level. This 
leads us to reject the hypothesis that differences in results across treatments are due to 
differences in scale, so we set aside this hypothesis in what follows. 
Our discussion so far has centered on the significance of individual coefficients, but 
of course some of the values of the other terms in the estimated equations vary between 
treatments because of difference in the sample values of characteristics. Figure 4 uses the 
Target equation to summarize the marginal impact of changes in the three attributes, 
evaluated for the three treatments and using average sample values for the relevant 
characteristics. As can be seen, on average the sensitivity to the attributes for couples lies 
about halfway between that for men and women for the Pesticide and Price attributes, but it 
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is the extreme figure (though close to the estimate for women) on the Fat attribute. 
Meanwhile, male sensitivity to the attributes is consistently higher than that for women.  
Figure 3 here. 
Figure 4 summarizes this information in a slightly different form. For each of the 
attributes in turn, the figure plots the results of a kernel regression using the conditional 
estimates for the marginal impact of changes in the attributes.13 The modes of these plots 
follow the pattern of Figure 3, but the distributions are quite different. 
Figure 4 here. 
The information on the marginal changes in values is summarized also in table 3 
where we again use the Target equation. For pesticide risk, the marginal values from the 
three treatments all differ from one another at a significance level of 10% or lower. For fat, 
the male value is significantly different from both the couples and the female value at a 
0.1% significance level or lower, but the figures for female and couples treatments are not 
significantly different. The picture is similar for the price attribute, where again the male 
figure is the outlier, differing significantly from the values elicited from females and 
couples.    
Table 3 here. 
For many economists, the marginal willingness to pay figures are potentially of 
more interest than those for marginal values. The right hand side of Table 4 shows the 
marginal WTP values, again calculated using average values for the characteristics on the 
basis of the Target equation. The WTP figures for pesticide are similar for male and 
couples treatments, with both significantly different to the figures for women interviewed 
alone. In fact the figure for women is barely half that for the couples interviewed. With fat, 
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there are again major differences between treatments with couples having a WTP figure 
that is only 53% of that for men. This difference is significant (p-value < 0.001 using the 
delta method), but the gaps between men and women and between women and couples are 
not significant. 
Having summarized the results we consider the performance of our five hypotheses 
on the relationship between individual and collective expressions of WTP. Table 4 presents 
two-sided Wald tests for the five hypotheses and their components. Overall, none of our 
hypotheses fare particularly well: for H1 the null of no difference between treatments is 
most clearly rejected and with it the unitary model. Meanwhile H2, the Bergstrom 
hypothesis, is rejected for pesticide though accepted for fat. H3, arising from some forms 
of the collective model of the household, proposes that household WTP equals the sum of 
individual WTP, but this rejected for both fat and pesticide. H4 supposes that hWTP equals 
the average figure for iWTP, but again this is clearly rejected for both goods. Finally, H5 
was the hypothesis that hWTP is equal to the value which would be obtained by targeting 
an identifiable decision-maker. This is rejected at the 1% level for pesticide and at the 10% 
level for fat.  
Table 4 here. 
The immediate cause of this raft of rejections is clear: for each good, the couples 
treatment leads to the extreme outcome, but whereas for the fat attribute couples provide 
the lowest WTP value, with the pesticide risk couples are at the other extreme. Theories 
based around the notion that couples are an average of their partners therefore do not fare 
well. Meanwhile, other theories that work for one good then tend to struggle with the other 
good. We speculate about deeper causes of this result in the final section. 
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Discussion. 
Stated preference methods, as widely used in market research, agricultural and 
environmental economics are usually based on an unspoken assumption that the identity of 
the person in the household who expresses values does not matter for the calculation of 
marginal values and measures of surplus. In contrast, our results suggest that indeed stated 
willingness to pay figures do depend on whether it is the couple or the individuals who 
provide information on values. We use data on household responsibilities to test for the 
efficacy of targeting as a strategy to sidestep the problem of interviewing whole households. 
While this attenuates the gaps between household and individual expressions of value, 
there are still significant differences. The different results for fat and pesticide risk suggest 
that there is no general rule which governs the relationship between the valuations given by 
the parts of the household and that given by the whole.  
The differences between the answers given by individuals and those offered by 
couples may arise from a number of factors. As the extensive research in psychology has 
emphasized (see Kerr et al 1996 for a survey), the decisions made by groups may not be an 
average of those made by their component individuals. Frequently, groups make more 
extreme decisions than those made by individuals. Bateman and Munro, 2005, for instance 
find couples making more risk averse choices when facing tasks together compared to 
when the partners faced the same decision-making tasks alone. Secondly, making choices 
as a couple offers opportunities for the exchange of information, about the good in question, 
but also about partners’ preferences. This may also be a potential source of differences in 
valuations, particularly when the goods to be valued are unfamiliar.  
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Given the accumulated evidence on income pooling, our results suggest that it 
would be wise to abandon the unitary household model in stated preference exercises.14 
Our work, however does not tell us which respondent (individual or household) is the 
better subject in terms of providing the most accurate estimate of revealed household 
behavior. Many decisions may not be taken by the household collectively – they may be 
delegated or taken unilaterally by partners. Hence refining the practice of stated preference 
may not only involve delving deeper into the relationship between household and 
individual willingness to pay, but may also require accurate means for predicting where in 
the household behaviorally-relevant values are determined.15 This remains the subject of 
further work possibly through the use of revealed preference data alongside stated 
preference data from households and their component parts.  However, as an interim 
measure practitioners and policy makers might wish to include a sub-sample of jointly-
interviewed householders in stated preference exercises.  
As a final point, it is also worth noting that in our data we have concentrated on the 
two adult members of the household; in the majority of the sample children were also part 
of the family group and there is plentiful evidence that, at least for some groups, children 
are influencers of household choices. Dosman and Adamowicz, 2006, for instance 
document the profound importance of children’s preferences in the choice of holiday 
destinations. 
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Table 1: Household characteristic variables. 
Variable Comment 
Healthy Categorical variable:  
Organic Dummy variable: value = 1 for households which regularly purchase organic 
food. 
Fat intake Categorical variable from 2-10 indicating perceived fat intake of couple 
relative to national average (= 6 on the scale). 
Spending Average weekly expenditure on food shopping (£) 
Income Categorical variable from 1-8 depending on household monthly income 
Education Categorical variable from 1-4 depending on educational level. 
Size Number of individuals regularly living in the household. 
Couple Dummy variable: value = 1 if the interview took place with both partners 
together. 
Female Dummy variable: value =1 if the interview took place with a female partner 
alone. 
DM Dummy for decision maker for food purchases; takes value = 1 if couple 
interviewed together or if individual interviewed and answers that s/he is 
wholly/usually responsible for food shopping decisions. 
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Table 2. Random parameters models. 
 
  No target No couple Target 
Variable Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Constant  1.14*** 4.51 1.02*** 4.43 1.06*** 4.34 
Pesticide risk  -0.44*** -9.88 -0.45*** -9.96 -0.44*** -8.92 
Fat content  -0.31*** -6.96 -0.23*** -5.25 -0.27*** -5.81 
Price  -0.91*** -12.12 -0.71*** -12.66 -0.77*** -11.28 
Pesticide risk x Couple -0.01 -0.17   -0.09 -1.21 
Fat content x Couple 0.19*** 4.91   0.17*** 2.66 
Price x Couple 0.25*** 3.25   0.25* 1.92 
Pesticide risk x Female 0.08 1.51 0.13*** 2.74 0.06 1.07 
Fat content x Female 0.16*** 3.07 0.05 1.41 0.16*** 2.78 
Price x Female 0.42*** 4.22 0.23*** 3.37 0.38*** 3.84 
Price x (Size-2) -0.07* -1.87 -0.16*** -5.50 -0.18*** -6.24 
Pesticide risk x Healthy 0.02*** 3.87 0.01 1.67 0.01 1.49 
Fat content x Healthy -0.01 -1.26 -0.02*** -2.85 -0.02*** -2.82 
        
Pesticide risk xDM   0.15*** 3.29 0.21*** 3.28 
Fat xDM   0.18*** 4.57 0.05 0.92 
Price xDM   0.17*** 2.89 0.01 0.10 
Scale factors Constant 1.35*** 5.56 0.56* 1.83 0.71*** 2.34 
Pesticide risk 0.44*** 9.88 0.45*** 9.96 0.44*** 8.92 
 Fat content 0.31*** 6.96 0.23*** 5.25 0.27*** 5.81 
 Price 0.91*** 12.12 0.71*** 12.66 0.77*** 11.28 
        
        
Log-likelihood (LL) -748  -750.4  -745.19  
LR test 1 (p-value) 0.000  0.000  0.000  
LR test 2 (p-value) 0.000  0.000  0.000  
Notes: p-values are for chi-squared statistics; DM = decision maker; LR = likelihood 
ratio; LR test 1: no coefficients; LR test 2: no randomness in parameters. 
*** = significant at 1% level 
** = significant at 5% level 
* = significant at 10% level 
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Table 3. Comparisons of marginal values and marginal WTP (targeted equation). 
 Coefficients Marginal WTP 
Pesticide Female Male Couple Female Male Couple 
Values -0.113  -0.354 -0.262 0.211 
(0.079) 
0.384 
(0.053) 
0.398 
(0.040) 
Wald tests.       
Versus male (p-value) 0.000***   0.054*   
Versus Couple (p-value) 0.005*** 0.072*  0.030** 0.820  
       
Fat       
Values  -0.150 -0.352 -0.133 0.281 
(0.077) 
0.382 
(0.044) 
0.201 
(0.036) 
Wald tests.       
Versus Male (p-value) 0.001***   0.243   
Versus Couple (p-value) 0.725 0.000***  0.329 0.000***  
       
Price       
Values  -0.534 -0.921 -0.660    
       
Wald tests.       
Versus Male (p-value) 0.000***      
Versus Couple (p-value) 0.188 0.000***     
Notes: standard errors for WTP in parentheses; *** = significant at 1% level; ** = significant 
at 5% level; * = significant at 10% level 
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Table 4.  Wald Tests of hypotheses (p-values). 
Hypothesis. Pesticide  Fat  
H1A. iWTPf= hWTP 0.030** 0.243 
H1A iWTPm= hWTP 0.820 0.000*** 
H1B iWTPf= iWTPm 0.054* 0.329 
H2 hWTP=min(iWTPm , iWTPf) 0.030** 0.243 
H3 hWTP=iWTPm + iWTPf 0.053* 0.000*** 
H4. hWTP = 0.5(iWTPm + iWTPf) 0.009*** 0.090* 
H5: hWTP = iWTPT 0.007** 0.10* 
*** = significant at 1% level; ** = significant at 5% level; * = significant at 
10% level 
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   ‘No Change’  ‘Alternative A’ 
Percentage of 
positive tests for 
pesticides in food 
 
30% 
 
 15% 
 
Percentage average 
fat content in food 
 
40% 
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Addition to your 
weekly household 
food shopping bill 
 
£0  £4.00 
  Choose 
‘No Change’ 
 Choose 
Alternative A 
Which would you 
choose? 
(tick one box only) 
    
Figure 1. A Typical Choice Question 
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Figure 2 Sensitivity to the attributes (whole sample). 
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Figure 3. Absolute Marginal values 
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Figure 4.  Fitted Conditional Distributions of Marginal values (Price, Pesticide and 
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1 In a quick survey of two leading environmental economics journals in 2005 we found 8 
out of 13 valuation papers mixed references to the individual respondent with the 
household’s valuation. 
2 In the marketing literature there are a few papers looking at the issue of who has influence 
in household decision-making but without a focus on testing particular theories (Arora and 
Allenby, 1999, and Dellaert et al, 1998). In a pioneering paper, Dosman and Adamowicz, 
2006, compare stated preference data over camp site features obtained from individual 
partners to the revealed household destination choices. Beaney and Scarpa, 2006, examine 
persuasion and agreement within couples in the context of attributes of a tropical island 
holiday. 
3 The final sample consisted only of heterosexual couples. 
4 Some studies have found significant gender effects in WTP (e.g. Teal and Loomis, 2000 
or Dupont, 2004). This does not say much about the relationship between household and 
individual WTP, except that clearly for at least one partner iWTP must depart from hWTP. 
5  It is worth being explicit: rejection of the first of these hypotheses does not imply 
rejection of income pooling, since hWTP may in fact differ from hWTPa.  
6 For example, in the case of fat we stated that: “One way to reduce fat intake would be to 
encourage food manufacturers to reduce the amount of fat in the food they produce and to 
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encourage them to make more ‘low fat’ products. If this was pursued across a wide range 
of foods, fat intake could be reduced without a major change in our shopping habits - the 
typical shopper would continue to buy the same or similar products, but they would contain 
less fat.” 
7 At very low levels of fat, it becomes difficult to maintain a safe diet. The consensus (see 
FAO, 1994) is that this minimum is at or below 15% of daily energy intake for an adult. 
Our range of figures is comfortably above this estimate, so that all the reductions in fat 
intake used in the survey are health risk improvements. 
8 Subjects provided their household size prior to the interview. Interviewers were given 
questionnaires with cost figures adjusted for household size. For example, if the household 
size was 4, the cost levels seen by the subject would be £4, £8, £14 and £20 respectively. 
9 Note that if no individual states that s/he is the person responsible for shopping (perhaps 
because the responsibility is shared) then the resulting variables would be perfectly 
collinear with the variables that interact couple with the attributes. 
10 In addition a small number of subjects were approached in public places. It became 
apparent from feedback from the interviewers that a proper separation of partners could not 
be reliably achieved. As a result we dropped these data from subsequent analysis. 
11 For Healthy, alternative aggregation methods were tried, but none was clearly better than 
this simple total.  
12 We also try non-interactive dummies for couples and female, but these are not significant 
in the presence of interactive effects. 
13  The smoothing procedure embodied in the kernel regressions leads to the slight 
exaggeration of the numbers of individuals with positive marginal values in the figure. 
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14 Our work also suggests the differences in results routinely obtained from stated and 
revealed preference may be partly down to differences in the identity of the decision-maker. 
15 It is tempting to assume that mailshots are a solution in the sense that the choice of 
respondent is then endogenous to the household. The danger is that the person selected to 
answer the survey may not in fact be the person who would be responsible for making the 
real decision. 
